Paper 2023/757

A Note on ``On the Design of Mutual Authentication and Key Agreement Protocol in Internet of Vehicles-Enabled Intelligent Transportation System''

Zhengjun Cao
Lihua Liu
Abstract

We remark that the key agreement scheme [IEEE Trans. Veh. Technol. 2021, 70(2): 1736--1751] fails to keep anonymity and untraceability, because the user $U_k$ needs to invoke the public key $PK_{U_j}$ to verify the signature generated by the user $U_j$. Since the public key is compulsively linked to the true identity $ID_{U_j}$ for authentication, any adversary can reveal the true identity by checking the signature.

Metadata
Available format(s)
PDF
Category
Attacks and cryptanalysis
Publication info
Preprint.
Keywords
Key agreementanonymitypublic keymutual authenticationintelligent transportation system
Contact author(s)
caozhj @ shu edu cn
liulh @ shmtu edu cn
History
2023-05-30: approved
2023-05-25: received
See all versions
Short URL
https://ia.cr/2023/757
License
No rights reserved
CC0

BibTeX

@misc{cryptoeprint:2023/757,
      author = {Zhengjun Cao and Lihua Liu},
      title = {A Note on ``On the Design of Mutual Authentication and Key Agreement Protocol in Internet of Vehicles-Enabled Intelligent Transportation System''},
      howpublished = {Cryptology ePrint Archive, Paper 2023/757},
      year = {2023},
      note = {\url{https://eprint.iacr.org/2023/757}},
      url = {https://eprint.iacr.org/2023/757}
}
Note: In order to protect the privacy of readers, eprint.iacr.org does not use cookies or embedded third party content.