Paper 2023/711
On the Quantum Security of HAWK
Abstract
In this paper, we prove the quantum security of the signature scheme HAWK, proposed by Ducas, Postlethwaite, Pulles and van Woerden (ASIACRYPT 2022). More precisely, we reduce its strong unforgeability in the quantum random oracle model (QROM) to the hardness of the one-more SVP problem, which is the computational problem on which also the classical security analysis of HAWK relies. Our security proof deals with the quantum aspects in a rather black-box way, making it accessible also to non-quantum-experts.
Metadata
- Available format(s)
-
PDF
- Category
- Public-key cryptography
- Publication info
- Preprint.
- Keywords
- quantum securityHAWKdigital signaturerandom oracle model
- Contact author(s)
-
serge fehr @ cwi nl
yhh @ cwi nl - History
- 2023-05-22: approved
- 2023-05-17: received
- See all versions
- Short URL
- https://ia.cr/2023/711
- License
-
CC BY
BibTeX
@misc{cryptoeprint:2023/711,
author = {Serge Fehr and Yu-Hsuan Huang},
title = {On the Quantum Security of HAWK},
howpublished = {Cryptology ePrint Archive, Paper 2023/711},
year = {2023},
note = {\url{https://eprint.iacr.org/2023/711}},
url = {https://eprint.iacr.org/2023/711}
}
