Oops, I did it again revisited: another look at reusing one-time signatures

Scott Fluhrer

Paper 2023/1905

Oops, I did it again revisited: another look at reusing one-time signatures

Scott Fluhrer, Cisco Systems

Abstract

In "Oops, I did it again" - Security of One-Time Signatures under Two-Message Attacks, Bruinderink and Hülsing analyzed the effect of key reuse for several one time signature systems. When they analyzed the Winternitz system, they assumed certain probabilities were independent when they weren't, leading to invalid conclusions. This paper does a more correct characterization of the Winternitz scheme, and while their ultimate conclusion (that key reuse allows for practical forgeries) is correct, the situation is both better and worse than what they concluded.

Note: Corrected reference to the FIPS 205 draft

Metadata

Available format(s): PDF
Category: Public-key cryptography
Publication info: Preprint.
Keywords: hash based signatures one time signatures WOTS
Contact author(s): sfluhrer @ cisco com
History: 2023-12-13: revised; 2023-12-11: received; See all versions
Short URL: https://ia.cr/2023/1905
License: CC0

BibTeX

@misc{cryptoeprint:2023/1905,
      author = {Scott Fluhrer},
      title = {Oops, I did it again revisited: another look at reusing one-time signatures},
      howpublished = {Cryptology ePrint Archive, Paper 2023/1905},
      year = {2023},
      note = {\url{https://eprint.iacr.org/2023/1905}},
      url = {https://eprint.iacr.org/2023/1905}
}